Tsinghua Science and Technology
Volume 18

Issue 6

Article 6

2013

Intermediate Spoofing Strategies and Countermeasures
Yang Gao
Department of Electronic Engineering, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China

Hong Li
Department of Electronic Engineering, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China

Mingquan Lu
Department of Electronic Engineering, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China

Zhenming Feng
Department of Electronic Engineering, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China

Follow this and additional works at: https://tsinghuauniversitypress.researchcommons.org/tsinghuascience-and-technology
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons, and the Electrical and Computer Engineering Commons

Recommended Citation
Yang Gao, Hong Li, Mingquan Lu et al. Intermediate Spoofing Strategies and Countermeasures. Tsinghua
Science and Technology 2013, 18(6): 599-605.

This Research Article is brought to you for free and open access by Tsinghua University Press: Journals Publishing.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Tsinghua Science and Technology by an authorized editor of Tsinghua
University Press: Journals Publishing.

TSINGHUA SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
ISSNll1007-0214ll06/10llpp599-605
Volume 18, Number 6, December 2013

Intermediate Spoofing Strategies and Countermeasures
Yang Gao, Hong Li , Mingquan Lu, and Zhenming Feng
Abstract: Intermediate spoofing can impact most off-the-shelf Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS)
receivers, therefore low cost detection of such spoofing is very important to protect the reliability of the GNSS
receivers used in critical safety and financial applications. This paper presents two strategies to analyze attacks by
intermediate spoofing attackers to identify the weaknesses of such attacks. The analyses lead to a code and carrier
phase consistency detection method with simulation results showing that this method can indicate the receiver
when spoofing has occurred. The method can be used by most receivers, is inexpensive, and requires only a small
software upgrade.
Key words: intermediate spoofing; dragging code phase strategy; low cost countermeasures; code and carrier
phase consistency

1

Introduction

Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) signals
are vulnerable to interference, jamming, and spoofing
due to their low power and open signal structure,
which means that navigation and timing services can
be easily interrupted by high power noise or mislead by
counterfeit signals. Spoofing is even more hazardous
than jamming, since it can lead the receiver to the
wrong position or the wrong time without the receiver
being aware of the problem so that the navigation
and timing results are still trusted by the user. These
attacks are not only dangerous to critical safety and
financial application but also to the location-based
security services such as geo-encryption and position
attestation[1] .
Spoofing attacks can be divided into simplistic
attacks, intermediate attacks, and sophisticated
attacks[2] . Simplistic attacks are implemented by
connecting a signal generator to an antenna, but this
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will not likely synchronize to the real satellite signal. To
deceive the receiver, a high power Radio Frequency
(RF) noise must first be transmitted to force the receiver
to lose its lock to the genuine signal, followed by the
counterfeit signal with a much higher power level than
the real signal. This kind of spoofing can be easily
detected because both the lost of the lock and the
abnormally high SNR will alert the receiver, but most
current civilian GPS receivers can not detect this and
successful attacks have already been demonstrated[3] .
Intermediate spoofing is an attack via a receiverspoofer, which is composed of a GNSS receiver
and a signal generator. The receiver tracks satellite
signals to accurately synchronize with the satellite
time and emphasis with estimates of the Doppler
frequencies and code phases of every satellite signal
tracked by the victim receiver. Then the signal generator
uses this information to generate counterfeit signals
synchronized to the genuine signal. The receiverspoofer adjusts the code phase and the carrier frequency
of the fake signal to align with the genuine signal
and then increases the power a little to control the
correlation peak so as to lead the correlation peak
away from the genuine peak. This kind of spoofing
can deceive a receiver without breaking the tracking
state, which is hard to detect by receivers except for the
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multi-antenna receivers. The receiver-spoofer has been
demonstrated by Humphreys et al.[2]
Sophisticated spoofing is similar to the intermediate
spoofing but with additional synchronization
equipments to transmit signals with a coordinated
carrier phase, which can even deceive multi-antenna
receivers. However, sophisticated attacks are very
expensive and no successful implementations have
been reported so far.
The detection of intermediate and sophisticated
spoofing is very important to prevent furtive invasions,
and has attracted much attention in recent years. Bit
latency detection[1, 2] requires the spoofer to predict an
unpredictable data bit, but this method usually needs
an additional clock. Signal parameter estimation[4]
treats the counterfeit signal as a multipath signal, but
requires a tracking loop structure change. Vestige Signal
Detection (VSD) methods including Ratio test, EarlyLate Phase Metric, and Signal Quality Monitoring[2, 5, 6]
are low cost, but have high false alarm rates due
to the multipath influence[7] . Other methods such as
monitoring of the signal power and bounding and
comparing of range rates[8] have been suggested, but no
simulations or tests have yet been given.
Though a receiver-spoofer has been developed that
can launch an intermediate attack, spoofing strategies
that can successfully and safely drag the tracking peak
have not yet been investigated. This study analyzes
strategies a spoofer could use to deceive a receiver and
weaknesses in these strategies with ways to detect these
strategies.
Mathematical models of a spoofer strategies are given
with simulation results which show that both strategies
will cause abnormal changes in the receiver states. A
countermeasure strategy is given which monitors the
Code and Carrier Phase Consistency (CCPC), including
a mathematical model and simulation results. This
research shows that intermediate spoofing can be
detected if more receiver states are monitored, which
will increase the spoofing difficulty.

2

frequency of the signals that the victim receiver tracks.
Step 2 The receiver-spoofer generates the fake
signal at a lower power and several code chips away
from the genuine one tracked by the victim receiver.
Step 3 The receiver-spoofer gradually adjusts the
code phase to align with the genuine signal, acting like
a multipath signal, and then increases the signal power
to control the tracking points.
Step 4 The receiver-spoofer adjusts the code phase
to drag the correlation peak away from the genuine
signal to then completely control the receiver.
The process is illustrated in Fig. 1.
In Steps 1-3, the fake signal will have very low power,
just like a multipath signal, to avoid detection. The
weakest part of the spoofing is Step 4 due to its
higher power and the competition with the genuine
signal, so this is also the best time for the receiver
to detect the spoofing. After a receiver-spoofer was
demonstrated in 2008, the device was tested on four
kinds of receivers. All the receivers were cheated and
kept tracking the “satellite signal” without losing the
signal lock or activating an alarm[9] .

3
3.1

Spoofing Strategies Analysis
Two spoofing strategies

The strategy of dragging code phase is very important
to keep the victim receiver tracking and to avoid
detection. Two strategies are shown in Figs. 2 and 3.
Strategy 1 shown in Fig. 2 maintains the consistency
between the carrier phase (Doppler) and the code phase

Intermediate Spoofing

Intermediate spoofing can deceive most off-the-shelf
receivers without them being aware. The spoofing
process of the receiver-spoofer can be divided into the
following steps[2] .
Step 1 The receiver-spoofer tracks the genuine
signals and estimates the code phase and the carrier

Fig. 1

The steps for intermediate spoofing.
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Fig. 2 Strategy 1: Adjust the code phase consistent with the
carrier phase.

Fig. 3 Strategy 2: Adjust the code phase independent of the
carrier phase.

(Doppler) via a Numerical Control Oscillator (NCO),
which is true in real signals where the code Doppler is
proportional to the carrier Doppler, because the Doppler
effect is caused by the motion between the satellite and
the receiver. Consider an L1 C/A signal as an example,
code
the relationship between the code Doppler (fDoppler
) and
carrrier
the carrier Doppler (fDoppler ) can typically be expressed
code
carrier
as fDoppler
D fDoppler
=1540.
Strategy 2 shown in Fig. 3 breaks this consistency
with the code Doppler no longer related to the carrier
Doppler, which is an abnormal situation.
Both strategies could be used to drag the tracking
points off in theory, but the responses of the receiver
will be quite different.
3.2

Mathematical model of intermediate spoofing

During the attack, the composite signal in the antenna
can be expressed as
S.t / D SS .t / C SA .t /
(1)
where SA .t/ represents authentication (genuine) signal
and SS .t/ represents the spoofing (counterfeit) signal,
with these two signals are given as
p
code
code
SA .t/ D 2PA  cŒfnom
t C fDoppler
t ˚ 
carrier
carrier
sinŒ2 .fnom
C fDoppler
/t C 
(2)
p
code
code
code
SS .t/ D 2PS  cŒfnom
t C fODoppler
t ˚O C fspoof
t 
carrier
carrier
carrier
sinŒ2 .fnom
C fODoppler
C fspoof
/t C O 

(3)

where PA and PS are the powers of the authentication
and the spoofing signals. cŒ is the function that
code
maps the code phase to the code square wave. fnom
code
is the nominal code frequency. fDoppler
is the code
carrier
Doppler shift due to the relative motion. fnom
is the
carrier
nominal carrier frequency. fDoppler is the carrier Doppler
frequency. ˚ and
are the code phase delay and

601

carrier phase delay due to the propagation from the
code
carrier
satellite to the receiver. fODoppler
, ˚O , fODopper
, and O are
the parameters that the spoofer estimates and uses to
carrier
code
generate the fake signal. fspoof
and fspoof
are the
carrier and code frequencies the spoofer adds to the fake
signal to drag the code phase.
The composite signal can also be written as
p
p
. 2PS
2PA /
S.t / D
SS .t /C
p
2PS


p
SA .t /
SS .t /
2PA  p
Cp
(4)
2PS
2PA
When the spoofer aligns with the code phase, the
carrier
carrier
following assumptions can be made: fODoppler
≈ fDoppler
,
code
code
O
O
O
f
≈f
, ˚ ≈ ˚ , and ¤ .
Doppler

Doppler

Then, the spoofer begins to adjust the code
carrier
code
phase by adding fspoof
and fspoof
to the signal
generator. Thus at the beginning of dragging, when
code
t ≈ 0 and fspoof
t ≈ 0, Eq. (4) can be approximated as
p
p
2PA /
. 2PS
SS .t /C
S.t / D
p
2PS
carrier
O /=2
SA .t / cosŒ fspoof
t C.
(5)
In Strategy 1, to keep the consistency between the
code phase and the carrier phase in the L1 C/A case,
carrier
the frequency offsets should be related as fspoof
D
code
[10]
1540  fspoof . Test
had shown that counterfeit
signal should not be too strong. When the power ratio
PS =PA ≈ 1:2, spoofing can be successful, thus Eq. (5)
can be approximated as
S.t / ≈ 0:046SS .t /C
carrier
O /=2
SA .t / cosŒ fspoof
t C.
(6)
Equation (6) shows that the power of composite
carrier
signal will quickly fade due to fspoof
during the
dragging procedure, which will increase the probability
of the victim receiver losing its lock. Thus, the spoofer
must increase the power ratio to avoid alerting the
victim receiver, which increases the risk of detection by
a signal power monitor.
In Strategy 2, the spoofer can avoid the power fading,
carrier
by setting fspoof
D 0, which was the strategy by
[2]
Humphreys et al. The composite signal can then be
expressed as
p
p
. 2PS
2PA /
S.t / ≈
SS .t /C
p
2PS
SA .t / cosŒ.

O /=2

(7)
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Only the code phase is adjusted when the spoofer
drags the correlation peak, while the carrier phase
(Doppler) of the fake signal remains consistent with
that of the genuine signal until the code phase has been
dragged away for more than one code chip.
3.3

Simulations of the two strategies

Simulations were made to validate the conclusions
using the process shown in Fig. 4.
The simulations were made at the signal parameter
level with the code phases and the carrier phases of the
genuine and counterfeit signals generated by calculating
the Doppler and nominal frequency. Then the receiver
tracks the “signal” described by the parameters to
estimate the code phase and the carrier phase[10] . The
tracking states and tracking results are stored and
compared with the input parameters. The simulation
process can be described as follows.
(1) At t D 0 s, the counterfeit signal is about four
code chips away from the genuine signal and at very
low power, the counterfeit signal gradually approaches
the genuine peak as shown in the first and second parts
of Fig. 1.
(2) At t D 60 s, the counterfeit signal exactly aligns
with the code phase of the genuine signal and increases
the power to control the tracking loop, as shown in the
third part of Fig. 1.
(3) At t D 65 s, the spoofer begins to drag the
tracking point away from the genuine point for more
than one chip, as the fourth and fifth parts of Fig. 1
show.
The CN0 (carrier-power to noise-density ratio) is
46 dBHz and the power ratio of the counterfeit signal
and the genuine signal is PS =PA D 1:2. The simulation
results of spoofing Strategy 1 are shown in Figs. 57. The simulation results of spoofing Strategy 2 are
shown in Figs. 8-10.

Fig. 5

Fig. 6

PLL lock variation during spoofing, Strategy 1.

Fig. 7 Tracking phase errors of the genuine and counterfeit
signals for Strategy 1.

Fig. 8

Fig. 4

Simulation descriptions.

CN0 variation during spoofing, Strategy 1.

CN0 variation during spoofing, Strategy 2.

Figures 7 and 10 show the code phase errors between
the code phase estimated by receiver and the true
input code phase (including the genuine signal and the
counterfeit signal).
The code phase error between the receiver and the
genuine signal is approximately zero from t D 0 s to
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Countermeasures

As indicated, Strategy 2 is the better choice for
the spoofer to more discretely drag the correlation
peak. However, the consistency between the carrier
phase and the pseudo range (code phase) will be
broken. Thus, the receiver should monitor the CCPC to
detect the spoofing.
4.1
Fig. 9

PLL lock variation during spoofing, Strategy 2.

CCPC mathematical model

Let P .t / represent the pseudo range between the
satellite and the antenna at time t. Then the increment
of P .t / between t1 and t2 can be expressed as
Z t2
P D P .t1 / P .t2 / D
vr .t /dt
(8)
t1

where vr .t / represents the relative radial velocity
between the satellite and the antenna. The range
increment can be measured for both the code and the
carrier[11, 12] as Z
t2

Pcode D
t1

Z

t2

Pcarrier D
Fig. 10 Tracking phase errors of the genuine and
counterfeit signals for Strategy 2.

t D 70 s; and code phase error between the receiver and
the counterfeit signal is larger than 1 chip during t D
0 s to t D 20 s; which means that the receiver initially
tracks the genuine signal.
After t D 80 s; the code phase error between the
receiver and the genuine signal keeps increasing, while
that between the receiver and the counterfeit signal
remains less than 0.5 chip, which means that the
counterfeit signal successfully controls the receiver.
Although, both strategies result in successful
spoofing attacks, the receiver states are quite
different. Comparing Figs. 5 and 6 with Figs. 8
and 9 shows that for a receiver with Phase Locked
Loop (PLL), when the spoofer in Strategy 1 began to
drag the correlation peak, the PLL lock varied greatly,
with value even below 0.2 for some time intervals
and the CN0 also fell below 10 dBHz, both of which
indicate loss of the lock to the receiver. In Strategy
2, the PLL lock value remains reasonable during the
spoofing process, with very small variations and the
CN0 remains high, which means that the spoofing was
harder to detect.

t1

code
code
c  ŒfDoppler
.t /=fnom
dt

carrier
carrier
c  ŒfDoppler
.t /=fnom
dt

(9)
(10)

where Pcode represents the range increment measured
in the code, Pcarrier represents that measured in the
carrier, and c represents the light speed. The two should
be the same without spoofing. CCPC statistics can be
defined as
(11)
ICCPC D Pcarrier Pcode
ICCPC can be calculated by the receiver as
carrier
carrier
ICCPC D c  ŒfNCO
.t2 t1 /=fnom
code
fNCO
.t2

or
ICCPC D c  Œ

code
t1 /=fnom


(12)

code
˚code =fnom

(13)
carrier
carrier
where fNCO
and fNCO
represent the frequencies of
the carrier and code NCOs in receiver (only contains the
doppler frequency, the nominal frequency is ignored),
and  carrier and ˚code represent the increments of
the carrier phase and the code phase measured in the
receiver.

4.2

carrier =.2

carrier
fnom
/

CCPC simulation

Figures 11-13 show simulation results for a spoofing
free scenario, spoofing using Strategy 1 and spoofing
using Strategy 2, where the spoofing occurred at t D
60 s and controlled the receiver after t D 100 s. The
simulation methodology is the same as that in Section

Tsinghua Science and Technology, December 2013, 18(6): 599-605

604

signal.

5

Fig. 11

Fig. 12

Range increment and ICCPC without spoofing.

Range increment and ICCPC for Strategy 1 spoofing.

Conclusions and Future Directions

Though intermediate spoofing can successfully deceive
most off-the-shelf GNSS receivers without breaking the
tracking or alerting the user, some receiver states are
still abnormal which can indicate the receiver that an
attack is occurring.
Two spoofing strategies were analyzed to identify the
abnormal signal variations in the receiver. Strategy 1
breaks the receiver tracking states; while Strategy 2
breaks the consistency between the carrier phase and
the code phase, but in a manner less likely to alert the
receiver. Strategy 2 would be more successful for most
receivers.
The weakness of Strategy 2 is exploited for a
spoofing detection method based on checking the
consistency between the carrier phase and the code
phase. Simulations show that ICCPC varies great when
spoofing occurs for both strategies compared to that
in the spoofing free situation. This detection method
proposed in this paper does not need additional
hardware, but can be implemented through only a
simple software upgrade.
Future research will investigate the appropriated
threshold and the related detection and false alarm rates
of this method, especially in multipath environments,
which can also result in inconsistencies between
the code phase and carrier phase, but with smaller
variations.
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Fig. 13

Range increment and ICCPC for Strategy 2 spoofing.

3. The first part shows Pcode and Pcarrier while the
second part shows the ICCPC .
As Figs. 11-13 show, for the spoofing free condition,
ICCPC remains very small throughout the whole process;
with the Strategy 1 spoofing, during the dragging
period, ICCPC increases to more than 100 meters
and then remains nearly constant after the successful
dragging, which is large enough to alert the receiver that
something is wrong; and with the Strategy 2 spoofing,
ICCPC keeps increasing during the code phase dragging
to more than 1000 meters, which is a very obvious
indicator that the receiver is tracking a counterfeit
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